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THE METHODOLOGY FOR DETECTING
AND MANAGING THE ABUSE OF IT SYSTEMS
This paper focuses on the processes of dealing with security breaches which are becoming
one of the most pressing problems in every organization whose systems are connected to the
global web. The study presents the most widely used methodologies which were designed in
order to detect and react to security violations in a systematic and eﬃcient way. Based on
presented methodologies, announced and supported by such credible organizations as SANS,
NIST, CERT R© or ISO, authors present their own methodology. It takes into account selected
aspects of these methodologies, with the purpose of creation a systematic and coherent
approach to the process of detecting and reacting to abuses in IT systems.
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MODEL PROCESU DETEKCJI I REAKCJI NA NADUŻYCIA
W SYSTEMACH INFORMATYCZNYCH
Niniejsza praca prezentuje aspekty związane z procesem reakcji na incydenty bezpieczeństwa,
które stają się jednym z najbardziej dotkliwych problemów każdej organizacji, której syste-
my informatyczne są połączone z siecią Internet. Autorzy przedstawiają najpopularniejsze
metodyki wykrywania i reakcji na incydenty bezpieczeństwa, opracowane i wspierane przez
takie uznane i poważane organizacje jak SANS, NIST, CERT R© czy ISO. Następnie au-
torzy prezentują swoją własną metodykę, która integruje wybrane elementy przedstawionych
rozwiązań w kompletne i spójne podejście do detekcji i reakcji na incydenty bezpieczeństwa.
Słowa kluczowe: zarządzanie incydentami bezpieczeństwa, SANS, NIST, CERT R©, ISO
1. Introduction
The number of reported incidents concerning IT systems keeps rising each year. It is
a result of IT technologies becoming increasingly common in nearly all areas of daily
life, as well as of the imperfections of currently employed solutions. Hostile attempts
to take control over an IT system have also become a means of ﬁghting competition,
thus eﬀective security measures are necessary to maintain competitive advantage on
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the market (numbers of security incidents reported to CERT/CC since 1988 are shown
in Figure 1 below1).
Organizations must take determined actions in order to minimize potential losses
and to prevent the occurrence of incidents in the future. The lack of such actions may
result in the increase of hostile activities in IT systems performed by intruders, as
well as greater ﬁnancial losses or external entities seizing the control over the systems.
Fig. 1. Number of security incidents reported to CERT/CC since 1988,
according to CERT/CC [1]
Conducting casual and uncoordinated steps towards detection and reaction to
abuse (deﬁned as security incidents resulting from misuse of granted privileges) is,
in most cases, ineﬀective and ineﬃcient. This is due to variety of reasons, the most
frequent being:
• wrong approach, where making one incorrect decision (i.e. concerning the data
seizure process) may ruin all activities carried out during the incident handling,
• lack of suitable tools, which may render the data seizure or data analysis impos-
sible,
• lack of decision making process, resulting in the inability to make any decision
or a considerable delay of undertaken actions,
• lack of funds or qualiﬁed personnel, which may prevent an eﬀective reaction to
abuse, or lead to delays and ineﬃciency,
• chronicity of conducted investigation, which may obstruct the process of identi-
fying the perpetrator (the general relation between abuse detection probability
and time is presented by the curve in the Figure 2 [8] – speciﬁc values depend on
particular incidents), as the electronic traces of incidents are volatile.
1Given the widespread use of automated attack tools, attacks against Internet-connected systems
have become so commonplace that counts of the number of incidents reported provide little
information with regard to assessing the scope and impact of attacks. Therefore, CERT/CC
stopped providing this statistic at the end of 2003. [1]
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Fig. 2. Curve showing the general relation between
abuse detection probability and time [8]
Moreover, in most cases handling of incidents takes place in tense atmosphere,
which signiﬁcantly increases the possibility of making mistakes by people engaged in
the process.
A solution which eﬀectively minimizes the inﬂuence of the aforementioned threats
is the implementation of a systematic approach to detection and reaction to the abuse
of IT systems. A properly designed and applied process, reinforced by procedures
which explicitly appoint the responsibilities of individual employees, imposes the con-
duct of activities in accordance to thoroughly planned steps. It allows eﬀective decision
making and increases the possibility of successful incident handling, which leads to
minimizing business risks.
2. Incident handling models
Currently, the most popular models of incident handling are:
• SANS model,
• NIST model,
• CERT R© model,
• ISO model.
2.1. SANS model
The SANS model, described in detail in the publication titled “Computer Security
Incident Handling Step by Step” [3], is based on the Navy Staﬀ Oﬃce Publication
5239-19 [2]. This model deﬁnes a 6-stage process of incident handling illustrated in
Figure 3.
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Fig. 3. SANS model schema
The stage schedule is as follows:
1. Preparation – during this phase the organizational and technical assumptions
concerning the general process are prepared. The stage ends with the approval
of the arranged plan by the Board of Directors.
2. Identiﬁcation – this stage is focused on the analysis of available information and
the identiﬁcation of a potential abuse and it ends with determining the incident’s
nature.
3. Containment – during this stage the inﬂuence of the abuse on the organization
is minimized.
4. Eradication – establishing the symptoms of the abuse, as well as its origins.
The aim of this stage is to eliminate the reasons of the abuse.
5. Recovery – the goal of the activities performed during this phase is the recovery
of the IT system and restoration of its operational status after eradicating the
abuse.
6. Follow-up – preparing a report and analyzing the progress of detecting and
reacting to abuse process in order to identify and implement potential enhance-
ments of the process.
Due to the fact that this model was the ﬁrst approach to systematic incident
handling and is the oldest amongst the presented four, it is most commonly used in
a variety of organizations. Within the model, the problem is eradicated as quickly as
possible, so restoring normal business operations is possible in a short time. However,
incidents are treated separately and without prioritization, comprehensive information
about the incident is not gathered and analyzed; there is also no analysis of the
incident’s impact on the organization.
2.2. NIST model
The second methodology of detecting and reacting to abuse was published in January
2004 by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. The NIST 800-61 [4]
model described in detail in the publication is illustrated in Figure 4.
This process comprises 4 stages:
1. Preparation – during this phase the process, organization and technology layers
are adjusted to the general process of handling security incidents. Once this phase
is completed, the organization is fully capable of detecting and reacting to abuse.
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2. Detection and analysis – the stage covers all actions concerning collection of
information on the way the system operates, concerning the detection of abuse
and analysis of its occurrence and its impact on the organization.
3. Containment, eradication and recovery – the scope of activities performed
in order to minimize the negative impact of abuse and to restore normal opera-
tional status of the IT system.
4. Post-incident activity – preparing improvements to the general process based
on the observations made during the handling of an incident. The goal of these
activities is to protect IT environment from the reoccurrence of similar abuse
events in the future and to adjust the process of detecting and reacting to se-
curity incidents to ﬂuctuating conditions (due to the constant development of
technology).
Fig. 4. NIST model schema
Comparing to the SANS model, using NIST approach comprehensive information
about the incident is gathered and analyzed. Also, an analysis of the incident’s impact
on the organization is performed, which sets higher requirements for technical skill
and planning. Moreover, incidents are still analyzed, managed and handled in isolation
from each other, which implies lack of categorization and prioritization.
2.3. CERT R© model
Another approach to incident handling was presented in a publication by Carnegie
Mellon University Software Engineering Institute, named ”Deﬁning Incident Man-
agement Processes for CSIRTs: A Work in Progress” [6]. It was originally created
speciﬁcally for handling incidents related to the Internet, but shortly after has been
adopted by many organizations for their needs.
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Fig. 5. CERTR© model schema
The main 5 stages in the CERT R©, model (Fig. 5) are as follows:
1. Prepare – During this stage incident management capability and the appropriate
process are established in order to eﬀectively handle detected incidents, which
includes security awareness trainings, preparation of incident reporting guidelines
forms and notiﬁcation lists, creation of incident handling tools, incident tracking
system and response policies and procedures etc.
2. Detect – In the Detect stage constituency reports are analyzed in order to detect
incidents. For this purpose also public and private mailing lists are scanned, while
assigned employees monitor the network and detect potential intrusions.
3. Triage – In this stage the incidents detected in the previous phase are categorized
in order to standardize their further management. After that they are associated
and compared with other incidents to identify any dependencies between them.
During this stage the incidents are also prioritized and a team of competent
employees is assigned to handle the incidents.
4. Respond (management, technical and legal) – The Respond stage consists
of the following sub-stages, which, performed subsequently, ensure a proper inci-
dent handling. The sub-stages are as follows:
• veriﬁcation – verifying whether the evidence used to make decisions in the
triage stage were correct, documentation – documenting all gathered infor-
mation concerning the detected incident,
• containment – minimizing possible inﬂuence of an incident on the organiza-
tion,
• notiﬁcation – notifying people on the notiﬁcation lists created in the Prepare
stage,
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• analysis & research – collecting information on the way system operates and
performing analysis concerning the root causes of the detected incident,
• eradication and mitigation – establishing signs of an incident and its deriva-
tion, as well as eliminating the reasons of the incident,
• recovery – restoring the regular operational status of the aﬀected IT system,
• follow-up – writing a report and performing an analysis of the progress of
detecting and reacting to the incident, connected with the identiﬁcation
of possible enhancements to the incident management process in a current
stage.
5. Protect – During this stage internal and external controls are updated and
adjusted based on the current threats that have been detected. If necessary,
all operational management and information systems are patched, modiﬁed and
reconﬁgured accordingly. Moreover, infrastructure evaluations are performed and,
based on threat and probability analysis, risks are determined and assessed. This,
in turn, is connected with vulnerability scanning.
It is worth to point out that among the authors of publications on this model
there are active members of CERT/CC – the main organization dealing with the
detection of abuse on the Internet. As a result this model may be treated as a reference
methodology of handling abuse incidents on the Internet or originating from it.
Comparing to previously described models, the CERT R© model puts emphasis on
triaging incidents – detected incidents are categorized and prioritized, so that their
further management can be standardized and resources having appropriate compe-
tencies can be assigned to handle them. There is also a comparison made between the
incidents in order to identify dependencies between them.
On the other hand, the main problem connected with the model is the fact that –
due to multiple sources of information regarding each incident – more work is required.
2.4. ISO model
Concurrently with the publication of the NIST model, the International Organization
of Standardization (ISO) introduced its own methodology, presented on the graph
(Fig. 6).
ISO model is fully compatible with the Deming cycle concept – PDCA (Plan-Do-
Check-Act), constituting the basis for ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 standards. The ISO
model proposes 4 stages:
1. Plan & Preparation – this stage covers all activities resulting in a development
of a new process of detecting and reacting to abuse, which oﬀers eﬀective control
and all necessary safety mechanisms.
2. Use – actions focusing on detection and reaction to abuse, conducted in accor-
dance to a plan arranged and approved in the previous stage.
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3. Review – a number of measures taken after the reaction to the incident is
ﬁnished, in order to determine the background of the event in detail.
4. Improvements – enhancing the general process of handling security incidents,
based on observations made under way and gained experience.
Fig. 6. ISO model schema
The main advantage of the ISO model is its integrity and compliance with other
ISO standards, thus, the systematic approach to detection and reaction to IT systems
abuse presented below is based on it as well. The disadvantage, though, is the fact
that ISO is the most generic model (a framework, actually) amongst the others, not
providing any ”cookbook recipes”.
3. Our systematic approach
There are diﬀerent varieties of abuse concerning IT systems, therefore, incident de-
tection and handling require carrying out numerous activities. Among these activities
we can point out certain distinctive stages adjusted to the needs of the organization
and its environment. These stages constitute the model of the process of detecting
and reacting to IT systems abuse.
The model of the process presented herein is a development of the ISO model,
with various steps taken from diﬀerent models (SANS, NIST, CERT R©) included.
Moreover, as it is based on the Deming Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle, it is possible to
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dynamically enhance it in order to adjust it to constantly ﬂuctuating needs of the
organization in regard to security.
The scheme of the systematic approach presented in this paper is shown in the
Figure 7.
Table 1 shows an overview of elements common between the model presented
and other models described in Section 2.
Fig. 7. A systematic approach to the process of detecting and
reacting to IT systems abuse [9]
The following stages of proposed process of detection and reaction to IT systems
abuse are described below.
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Table 1
Comparision of incident handling models
SANS NIST CERT ISO Our approach
Eradicating the problem as quickly as
possible, so restoring normal business
operations is possible in a short time

Cyclic improvements introduced to the
process
   
Gathering and analyzing comprehen-
sive information about the incident
  
Performing analysis of the incident’s
impact on the organization
  
Categorization and prioritization of de-
tected incidents, so that their further
management can be standardized and
resources having appropriate compe-
tencies can be assigned to handle them
 
A comparison being made between the
incidents in order to identify dependen-
cies between them
 
Using multiple sources of information
on the incidents
 
Integrity and compliance with other
ISO standards
 
Bi-directional exchange of information
on the incident (Publishing sub-phase)

3.1. Planning & Preparation
The Planning & Preparation stage constitutes the key phase of deﬁning the process
of detection and reaction to abuse in IT systems. The actions carried out are focused
on the development of organizational infrastructure for IT incident handling in three
following layers:
1. process layer – creating a strategy, policy and detailed procedures for detection
and reacting to incidents,
2. organization layer – assigning human resources necessary for incident handling,
deciding on organizational structure (distributed or centralized), appointing a
team responsible for reaction to security incidents, creating a training program
for team members and employees, etc.,
3. technology layer – the development and implementation of mechanisms for gath-
ering information on events concerning security of all IT systems used in the
organization and of tools supporting the process of detecting and reacting to
abuse.
The strategy of detecting and reacting to abuse is the reﬂection of the will of the
Board to maintain security within the organization. The creation of the strategy as
a reference point for people engaged in the process is a means of gaining support for
the actions taken in the future.
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The strategy of detecting and reacting to abuse should answer the following
questions:
• What is the purpose of incident handling?
• For whom is this process conducted? Who is the constituency?
• Who beneﬁts from the team’s incident handling eﬀort?
• Who is responsible for maintaining the process (funding and resources)?
• What kind of services will be provided? – (The answer to this question requires
a decision of the Board, whether incidents will only be registered or additional
analysis and investigation will be performed.)
• Who is responsible for the process of detecting and reacting to abuse in IT
systems?
Based on the strategy, a policy of detecting and reacting to abuse is deﬁned.
In order to achieve this, the Board needs to specify in detail how the organization
intends to detect and react to incidents. Additionally, the Board should indicate the
relation between reaction to incidents and the performance of business processes, the
requirements in regard to incident handling and the assumptions concerning work of
the team responsible for reaction to information security incidents. Finally, what also
should be considered are the regulatory requirements that need addressing during the
general process.
A key element of creating the strategy and the policy of security incident man-
agement is management buy-in (it is easier when the created policy is based on the
strategy deﬁned by the Board). An unambiguous message to all employees (in the form
of an internal regulation) is equally important, informing them of the new policy and
imposing its applications.
The next step within the scope of the process layer is to design an abuse manage-
ment model, including detailed procedures, forms and tools for detection, classiﬁcation
and handling of incidents, as well as generating reports. During this phase it is vi-
tal to pay special attention to the availability of necessary components like Change
Management processes or, above all, Patch Management processes.
The speciﬁed policy and security incident management model should comply with
the general information security policy of the organization. Moreover, it is crucial to
assure that the activities carried out during the reaction to security incidents are in
line with the current regulations.
For the purpose of eﬀective information security incident handling, a special
ISIRT (Information Security Incident Response Team) team should be appointed
and adequately placed within the organizational structure. On creating the team,
aspects such as the character of the team (whether it should operate in a distributed
or centralized manner), the number of members and their competencies need to be
taken into consideration. Individual roles and responsibilities within the group also
need to be speciﬁed. Practice shows that ISIRT in most organizations is not a stand-
alone unit, but a virtual entity (gathering as need arises). It is directed by a senior
manager and supported by specialists from various ﬁelds connected with security
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incidents (data analysis, seizure of evidence, etc.). The team is appointed according
to the security incident management model whenever a crisis occurs, and dismantled
after the incident has been handled.
The element of the technology layer of the process of detecting and reacting to
abuse in IT systems are the tools (both hardware and software). They are to assure
the completeness of the registration of incidents and to support the data analysis and
incident handling, as well as to provide non-repudiation of data which may potentially
become evidence in court.
On deﬁning the technology layer it is important to consider the implementation
of security monitoring systems, the vulnerability of assessment systems and the in-
stallation of antivirus applications. These activities are not directly connected with
the process of detection and reaction to abuse, but they may have a great positive
inﬂuence on its eﬀectiveness. They are useful in gathering additional information on
events occurring within the systems or in minimizing the number of incidents and
abuses.
The last element of the process of detection and reaction during Planning &
Preparation stage is conducting trainings which are adequate to the needs and com-
petencies of people involved in the general process, directly or indirectly. It is also
crucial to carry out so called Security awareness program on abuse of IT systems and
related security oriented activities. These need to be undertaken in case of suspected
abuse and conducted by the organization with regard to detection and reaction to the
abuse.
The approved methodology of detecting and reacting to security incidents should
be thoroughly tested. This can be performed as a general test or tests of individual
procedures (e.g. the procedure of informing about a detected abuse). Any potential
deﬁciencies observed during the process of detecting and reacting to abuse events
should be corrected during the testing phase, and the process should become the
subject of a next test.
As a result of completing this stage, in accordance to the steps described, the
organization should be fully prepared to correctly detect and react to abuse of IT
systems.
3.2. Use
The Use stage constitutes the central part of the presented process of detection and
reaction to IT systems abuse. In this phase we can deﬁne the following steps:
1. Detection and reporting,
2. Evaluation and decision making,
3. Reaction.
Detection and reporting focuses on collecting events connected with IT environ-
ment security and reporting them to all people who may be involved. During this step,
all events that take place in the IT infrastructure are taken into consideration. These
may be those which alone seem to be an abuse incidents as well as those connected
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with individual, independent events whose further analysis and comparison to detect-
ed abuse incidents may provide information on the background of the happening (user
ID, computer name, network card address, etc.).
The process of collecting information can be based on the automatic acquisition
of data concerning the IT system activities (e.g. through the analysis of system logs
or IDS reports), or on the analysis of events coming from the users or the personnel
maintaining the systems.
In the next step, i.e. the Evaluation and decision making, the classiﬁcation of
abuse is conducted along with the assessment of its impact on the IT environment.
Depending on the decision made, the course of action regarding the abuse event is
indicated. During this step the decisions concerning the seizure of evidence material
and its analysis are made.
It is important to remember that any measures taken in this step should be car-
ried out in a way that will enable securing the evidence material which is understood
as source data enabling the identiﬁcation of abuse, (and the perpetrator), as well as
deﬁning deﬁciencies which made the abuse possible. It is also vital to examine the
current status of IT system that has been aﬀected by the abuse.
After the available data has been analyzed in compliance with the scheme of
detection and reaction to abuse, and after the abuse has been properly classiﬁed, the
following actions can be conducted:
1. Publishing – contacts with environment with the purpose of acquiring or passing
information on the detected abuse (informing the Board, internal and external
communication department, cooperating CSIRTs, etc.),
2. Containment – all actions undertaken in order to minimize the negative inﬂuence
of the abuse on the IT environment in the organization,
3. Eradication – measures connected with the elimination of factors which made
the abuse possible,
4. Recovery – activities carried out in order to restore normal operational status of
the IT system.
When no eﬀective ways to prevent or eliminate threats concerning abuse in the
IT environment are available [7], a crisis committee (capable of launching Business
Continuity Plan) should be appointed.
It is worth to point out at this stage that the eﬃciency of actions will depend
directly on the results of analysis of available evidence material and on the eﬀectiveness
of conduct of the forensic process – that is on the eﬀectiveness of the approved security
incident management model.
3.3. Review
After the analysis of security incident connected with the identiﬁed abuse, the follow-
ing steps are conducted during the Review phase:
1. analysis of evidence material located outside the IT system the abuse concerned,
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2. preparation of enhancements for the IT environment connected with the identiﬁed
abuse,
3. preparation of potential improvements to the process of detecting and reacting
to abuse in case when deﬁciencies are discovered,
4. preparation of ﬁnal report.
The focus of the Review stage is a detailed investigation analysis conducted
without any reference to the system directly associated with the abuse. It is due to
the fact that not all signs of the activities concerning abuse are registered in the IT
system. Thus, in most cases, it is necessary to secure and analyze the information
recorded by diﬀerent components of IT infrastructure which were directly connected
to any abuse (e.g. network devices logs).
Towards the end of activities concerning abuse, handling an overall assessment
should be conducted. The facts to be considered are measures undertaken by ISIRT
within the layers of process, organization and technology. Such assessment should
answer the following questions:
• What (speciﬁc) event took place?
• How well did the team and management handle the incidents?
• Were the procedures followed during the handling of abuse?
• Were the procedures adequate to the analyzed situation?
• What should be done diﬀerently by the team and management next time a similar
situation occurs?
• What action could prevent similar incidents from reoccurring?
• What additional tools and resources are necessary to detect, analyze and handle
abuse events in the future?
An evaluation of conducted activities provides the team with lessons learned and
enables to enhance the process of detecting and reacting to abuse. Furthermore, it is
very helpful when preparing the ﬁnal report, covering all actions taken previously (in
Use and Reaction stages).
The ﬁnal report should describe in detail:
• information about the abuse (including the speciﬁc IT systems associated with
the abuse, users connected with the abuse, etc.),
• measures taken by ISIRT,
• seized evidence material,
• conclusions and recommendations.
The last step of this stage is archiving all information gathered, as well as all
the evidence materials seized during individual steps of Use and Review stages. This
should be done in a manner which makes it impossible for unauthorized personnel to
access the data.
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3.4. Improvements
The Improvements stage, similarly to the ISO model, focuses on the implementation
of prevention, detection and correction mechanisms in the IT environment of the or-
ganization. It also concentrates on implementing enhancements to the general process
of detection and reaction to IT systems abuse in all layers (process layer, organization
layer and technology layer).
These actions aim at both minimizing the possibility of reoccurrence of simi-
lar incidents in the future and providing the most eﬀective reaction to a detected
abuse. Conducting an update of the existing risk analysis concerning IT systems, in
accordance with the approved methodology, should be a support measure for such
actions.
4. From theoretical model to practical implementation
Shortly after development of the original version of the described approach, authors
of this paper started to assist large Polish ﬁnancial institution2 in implementing this
incident handling model into the organization. The project’s goals were to systematize
activities included in the incident handling process, deﬁne and assign responsibilities
related to it, allow for appropriate control over the activities and provide means of
measurement and accountability of the process. Implementation of the model took 9
months and has been completed over one year ago, since when the approach is ef-
fectively and eﬃciently supporting the ﬁnancial institution in the incident handling
activities. The project included assistance in deﬁning the organizational units realiz-
ing the process, activities related to it together with their frequencies and minimal
inaccessibility time, development of internal procedures and guidelines, assessment of
risks, setting the process’s controls and measures, assigning support systems to the
process and deﬁning its relation to other processes.
Original form of the approach was a result of in-depth analysis of both strengths
and weaknesses of the existing incident handling models (described in Section 2) and
organizations needs regarding incident handling. Initially, however, it did not put
that much emphasis on the publishing sub-phase, treating it only as one-directional
source of information – from the process, to its stakeholders – similarly to the CERT R©
model’s notiﬁcation sub-phase.
During the model’s practical implementation in an actual business organization,
it appeared that beneﬁts could be taken if the exchange was bi-directional, parallel
acquiring and passing information on the detected abuse from and to the stakeholders.
Thus, the model was appropriately modiﬁed into its present form, described in this
paper.
2 For the reasons of information classiﬁcation, the ﬁnancial institutionss name cannot be publicly
disclosed.
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5. Summary
The main goal of every approach to the process of detecting and reacting to IT systems
abuse is to constitute guidelines which may help properly manage potential security
breaches. The economic justiﬁcation of all undertaken activities is also an important
aspect of such processes for every organization. It is also necessary to remember that
incident handling models are only a part of enterprise security architecture and – as
such – cannot be considered in isolation from other security elements.
As presented in this paper, there are several ways to achieve this goal, and each
subsequently developed incident handling model attempts to provide more complex
approach. However, it is crucial to choose the one which suits the organization’s needs
best and to ensure its proper implementation and application.
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